Martin Antonenko
A Fixture
- Joined
- Jul 11, 2008
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Today there are - unusual for my series here - only three photos and a lot of text.
But it is the only accessible document about what really happened to these "friends" during the brief friendship between Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union ...
Friends among themselves ...
On November 13, 1940, the following people meet in the "New Reich Chancellery" in Berlin:
Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler and Reich Foreign Minister von Rippentrop on the one hand and Soviet Foreign Minister Wjacheslaw Molotow, one of Stalin's closest companions, and Soviet Ambassador Wladimir Dekanasow. There is also the interpreter Gustav Hilger (seen between Hitler and Molotov) ...:
Hitler phrases and tries to find out what the Russians are up to, Molotov tacts carefully, Ribbentrop is also allowed to say something briefly three times and so the world is divided up by the way - Hilger and Dekanasov translate and Ambassador Dekanasow ...
... also takes notes and keeps a record, which he will write down two days later.
It is interesting that the “Führer”, who had just fantasized about the German superiority, is in a hurry towards the end to end the conversation because there is a risk of British bombing attacks.
Dekanasow's transcript has been preserved - a document of the times.
Here is the translation - unchanged, although it is interesting that Dekanasow always writes of the "Führer", not of "Adolf Hitler" ...:
Der Führer took up Molotov's remark during yesterday's conversation that the German-Russian agreement had been fulfilled with the exception of one point, namely Finland.
Molotow specified that this remark referred not only to the German-Russian agreement itself, but above all to the secret protocols (the secret supplementary agreement of the "Hitler-Stalin Pact", M.R.).
Der Führer replied that in the secret protocol zones of influence and areas of interest between Germany and Russia had been established and divided up. As far as it was a matter of actual occupation, the German side kept to the agreements, which was not absolutely the case on the Russian side. In any case, Germany has not occupied any territory that lies within the Russian sphere of interest.
Lithuania was already mentioned yesterday. There could be no doubt that in this case the deviations from the original German-Russian agreement were essentially due to a Russian initiative. It remains to be seen whether the difficulties which the Russians had proposed to avoid would actually arise from the partition of Poland later. In any case, the Lublin Voivodeship was not an economic substitute for Lithuania. However, the German side saw that a situation arose in the course of events that made it necessary to correct the original agreement.
The same applies to Bukovina. As such, Germany would only have disinterested in Bessarabia in the original agreement. Nevertheless, it also realized here that the correction of the agreement was expedient for the other partner from certain points of view.
The situation with regard to Finland is very similar. Germany has no political interest there. The Russian government is aware of this. During the Russo-Finnish war, Germany meticulously complied with all of its obligations regarding absolutely benevolent neutrality.
Molotow interjected here that the Russian Government had nothing to complain about in Germany's position in this conflict.
Der Führer pointed out in this connection that he even stopped ships in Bergen that were transporting weapons and ammunition to Finland, which Germany in and of itself had no right to do. Through its attitude in the Russo-Finnish war, Germany would have brought itself into serious opposition to the rest of the world, particularly Sweden. The consequence of this was that during the subsequent campaign in Norway, which in and of itself entailed considerable risks, a large number of divisions had to be deployed to secure against Sweden, which it would otherwise not have needed.
The actual situation is as follows: According to the German-Russian agreements, Germany recognizes that Finland is primarily interested in Russia politically and is in its zone of interest. However, there are two points of view for Germany:
1.) be very interested in the nickel and wood deliveries from Finland for the duration of the war, and
2.) it does not want a new conflict in the Baltic Sea that restricts its freedom of movement in one of the few trading seas that it still has. If it were claimed that Finland was occupied by German troops, this was totally inaccurate. However, troops were being transported through Finland to Kirkenes, about which Russia had been officially informed by Germany. Because of the length of the route, the trains would have to stop two or three times in Finnish territory along the way. However, as soon as the passage of the troop contingent to be transported was completed, no more troops would be transported through Finland.
He (Der Führer) pointed out that both German and Russian interests were naturally directed towards not allowing the Baltic Sea to become a battle zone again. Since the Russo-Finnish war, there has been a change in the possibilities of military operations in so far as England has long-range bombers and destroyers with great range. This would give the British the opportunity to get stuck in Finnish airports.
In addition, there is a purely psychological factor that is extremely stressful.
The Finns defended themselves valiantly and won the sympathy of the world, especially Scandinavia. In Germany, too, during the Russo-Finnish war, there was a certain irritation among the people about the attitude that Germany had to take and has actually taken on the basis of the agreements with Russia. Based on the foregoing considerations, Germany did not want a new Finnish war.
But this would not affect Russia's legitimate claims. Germany did this through its stance on various issues, including: on the question of the fortification of the Aaland Islands, proven again and again. For the duration of the war, however, his economic interests are just as important in Finland as in Romania.
Germany expects these interests to be taken into consideration all the more since it itself showed understanding for Russia's wishes on the question of Lithuania and Bukovina. In any case, it has no political interests whatsoever in Finland and fully accepts the fact that this country belongs to the Russian zone of influence.
In his reply, Molotov pointed out that the 1939 agreement referred to a certain stage of development that ended with the end of the Polish War, while the second stage ended with the defeat of France and is now actually in the third Stage stand.
He (Molotov) recalled that the original agreement with the secret protocol established the common German-Russian border and settled questions regarding the Baltic neighboring states, Romania, Finland and Poland. He also agreed with the Fiihrer's remarks about the corrections made. If, however, he were to take stock of the situation following the defeat of France, he would have to declare that the German-Russian agreement had not been without influence on the great German victories.
On the question of correcting the original agreement with regard to Lithuania and the Lublin Voivodeship, Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Union would not have insisted on this correction if Germany had not wanted it. He just believed that the new solution was in the interests of both sides.
The RAM (Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop) interjected that, although Russia had not made this correction an absolute condition, at least it had been very committed to it.
Molotow maintained that the Soviet government would not have refused to leave things as they were foreseen in the original agreement. In any case, Germany had received compensation for the concession in Lithuania on the territory in Poland.
Der Führer interjected here that, from an economic point of view, one could not speak of a settlement with this exchange.
Molotow then came to speak of the question of the corner of the Lithuanian area and emphasized that the Soviet Government had still not received a clear answer from Germany on this question. However, she expects an opinion.
Concerning the Bukwina he (Molotow) admitted that this was an additional area not mentioned in the secret protocol.
Russia initially limited its demands to northern Bukovina. In the current circumstances, however, Germany must understand Russia's interest in South Bukovina. Here too, however, Russia would not have received an answer to its question on this matter.
Instead, Germany would have guaranteed the entire territory of Romania and completely ignored the Russian wishes for South Bukovina.
Der Führer replied that it would mean considerable concession on the German side if part of Bukovina could be occupied by Russia at all. According to an oral agreement, the former Austrian territories should fall into the German sphere of interest. In addition, the areas belonging to the Russian zone were mentioned by name, e.g. Bessarabia. However, there is not a word in the agreements about Bukovina. Finally, the exact meaning of the word "sphere of influence" was not further defined.
In any case, Germany did not violate the agreement in the slightest. On the objection of Molotow Der Führer replied that the corrections relating to the corner of the Lithuanian region and Bukovina were not of great importance compared to the corrections that Germany had made elsewhere by means of arms.
Molotow insisted, however, on his earlier opinion that the two corrections Russia wanted were of negligible importance.
Der Führer replied that if German-Russian cooperation were to produce positive results in the future, the Soviet Government would have to understand that Germany was in a life-and-death struggle which it wanted to end successfully under all circumstances. For this a number of economic and military-related conditions are necessary, which Germany wants to ensure under all circumstances. If the Soviet Union were in a similar situation, Germany would and should show an equal understanding of Russian requirements. The conditions that Germany wanted to secure for herself did not contradict the agreements with Russia.
The German wish to avoid a war in the Baltic Sea with unforeseeable consequences does not mean a violation of the German-Russian agreements, according to which Finland falls into the Russian zone of influence. The guarantee given at the request and request of the Romanian government is not a violation of the agreements regarding Bessarabia. The Soviet Union must be clear that, within the framework of expanded cooperation between the two countries, advantages of quite different proportions than the insignificant corrections that are now under discussion can be achieved.
Much greater successes could then be achieved, provided that Russia was not now looking for success in areas in which Germany was interested in the war.
The future successes would be all the greater, the more Germany and Russia succeeded in fighting back to back to the outside world, and would be the smaller the more the two countries stood close to each other. In the former case there would be no power in the world that could oppose the two countries.
Molotow in his reply he agreed with Der Führer's final conclusions. He underlined the position of the Soviet leaders, and in particular of Stalin, that it was possible and expedient to deepen and activate relations between the two countries. In order to give these relations a permanent basis, however, questions would also have to be resolved which, although of secondary importance, spoil the atmosphere of the German-Russian relationship.
Finland is one of these questions. If there was good agreement between Russia and Germany, this question could be resolved without war, but neither German troops should be in Finland nor political demonstrations against the Soviet Russian government should take place in that country.
Der Führer replied that the second point could in no way be up for debate, since Germany had nothing at all to do with these matters. In addition, demonstrations are easy to organize, and it is difficult to determine afterwards who the real arranger was. With regard to the German troops, however, he could give an assurance that if a general arrangement were reached, no more German troops would appear in Finland.
Molotow replied that by demonstrations he also understood the sending of Finnish delegations to Germany or receptions of Finnish personalities in Germany. The fact that German troops were present had, moreover, led to an ambiguous attitude on the part of Finland. So z. B. issued slogans that "no one is a Finn who agrees to the last Russian-Finnish peace treaty", and the like.
Der Führer replied that Germany had always acted moderately and that both Finland and, above all, Rumania had advised them to accept the Russian demands.
Molotow replied that the Soviet Government considered it its duty to finally settle and clarify the Finnish question. This does not require any new agreements. The old German-Russian agreement assigns Finland to the Russian sphere of interest.
Der Führer concluded on this point that Germany did not want war in the Baltic Sea and that Finland urgently needed as a supplier of nickel and wood. Politically it was not interested and, unlike Russia, had not occupied Finnish territory. Incidentally, the march through of the German troops would be over in these days. Further transports would then no longer take place.
The decisive question for Germany was whether Russia intended to go to war with Finland.
Molotow answered this question somewhat evasively by declaring that everything would go smoothly if the Finnish government gave up its ambiguous attitude towards the USSR and if the people's agitation against Russia (issuing slogans such as the one mentioned above) ceased.
On the objection of Der Führer, that he was afraid that Sweden would next intervene in a Russo-Finnish war, replied Molotow, that he could not say anything about Sweden, but had to emphasize that both Germany and the Soviet Union were interested in Sweden's neutrality. Both countries are of course also interested in the peace and quiet in the Baltic Sea, but the Soviet Union is quite capable of ensuring peace in this area.
Der Führer replied that perhaps in another part of Europe one would see how even the best military will be greatly impaired by geographical conditions. He could therefore imagine that in the event of a new conflict in Sweden and Finland a kind of resistance cell would be formed, which England or America would provide air bases. This would force Germany to intervene.
He (Der Führer) however would be very reluctant to do so. He had already mentioned yesterday that there might also be a need to intervene in Salonika, and the Salonika case suffices for him entirely. He has no interest in having to work again in the north. He repeated that in a future cooperation between the two countries completely different results could be achieved and that in the course of the peace Russia would get everything that she thought she owed.
It might just be a 6 month or a year delay. In addition, the Finnish Government had just sent a note in which it guaranteed the closest and most friendly cooperation with Russia.
Molotow replied that the words did not always correspond to the deeds, and stuck to his previously expressed view that peace in the Baltic Sea region could be absolutely secured if Germany and Russia were completely clear on the Finnish matter. Under these circumstances he did not see why Russia should postpone the realization of her wishes for half a year or a whole year. The German-Russian agreement did not contain any deadlines, and neither of the partners had tied their hands in their sphere of interest.
Referring to changes to the agreement made at the request of Russia, Der Führer declared that there should be no war in the Baltic Sea. A Baltic Sea conflict would be a heavy burden for German-Russian relations and for the great cooperation in the future. In his view, however, future cooperation is more important than resolving second-rate issues at the moment.
Molotow replied that it was not a question of the war in the Baltic Sea, but of the Finnish question and its settlement under the previous year's agreement. In response to a question from the Fuehrer, he stated that he was envisaging this settlement to the same extent as in Bessarabia and the border states, and asked the Fuehrer to comment on it.
When Der Führer replied that he could only repeat that there should be no war with Finland because such a conflict could have profound repercussions, Molotov declared that this statement brought a new element into the discussion that had not been expressed in the previous year's treaty would be carried into it.
Der Fiihrer replied that during the Russo-Finnish war, despite the danger that allied bases might be established in Scandinavia in connection with it, Germany meticulously kept its obligations to Russia and always advised Finland to give in.
The RAM (Ribbentrop) pointed out in this connection that Germany had even gone so far as to forbid the Finnish President from using a German cable line for a radio address to America.
Der Führer went on to say that just as Russia had pointed out at the time that a partition of Poland could lead to a strain on German-Russian relations, he now declares with the same frankness that a war in Finland would put such a strain on German-Russian relations would represent, and he asked the Russians to show exactly the same understanding in this case as he would have shown a year ago on the Poland question.
Given the ingenuity (sic! Note! M. R.) of Russian diplomacy, ways and means would certainly be found to avoid such a war.
Molotow replied that the German fear that a war might break out in the Baltic Sea was incomprehensible to him. In the previous year, when the international situation for Germany was worse than it is now, the Reich did not raise this question.
Quite apart from the fact that Germany was occupying Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium, it had completely crushed France and also believed that it had already defeated England. He (Molotow) does not see where the danger of war in the Baltic Sea should come from under these circumstances. He must demand that Germany adopt the same attitude as in the previous year. If it did so unconditionally, there would certainly be no complications related to the Finnish question.
If, however, there were reservations, a new situation would arise that would then have to be discussed.
In reply to Molotov's remarks about the military safety of the Finnish question, the Fuehrer emphasized that he, too, knew quite a bit about military matters and that it was entirely possible that if Sweden were to participate in an eventual War stuck America in these areas.
He (Der Führer) I wanted to end the European war and could only repeat that a new war in the Baltic Sea would put a strain on German-Russian relations with consequences that could not be foreseen in view of Sweden's unclear position.
Would Russia declare war on America if it intervened in connection with the Finnish conflict?
As Molotow replied that this question was not topical, Der Führer replied that it would be too late to comment if it were topical. When Molotov then declared that he saw no signs of a war breaking out in the Baltic Sea, the Fiihrer replied that in this case everything would be fine and that the whole discussion was actually of a purely theoretical character.
The RAM (Ribbentrop) in summary pointed out that
1.) Der Führer had declared that Finland would remain in Russia's sphere of interest and that Germany would not maintain any troops there;
2.) Germany has nothing to do with the demonstrations of Finland against Russia, but asserts its influence in the opposite direction, and
3.) the decisive problem of secular importance lies in the cooperation between the two countries, which had already brought great advantages for Russia in the past, but would produce advantages in the future, in addition to the things that have now been discussed, would seem completely insignificant. There is actually no reason to make the Finnish question a problem at all. Maybe it was just a misunderstanding. Incidentally, by concluding peace with Finland, Russia had strategically fulfilled all of its wishes. Demonstrations in a defeated country are not entirely unnatural, and if, for example, the marching through of the German troops provoked certain reactions from the Finnish population, these would also disappear when the marching through stopped. Therefore, if you look at things in real terms, there are no divergences between Germany and Russia.
Der Führer pointed out that both parties agreed in principle that Finland was part of the Russian sphere of interest. Therefore, instead of continuing a purely theoretical discussion, one should rather turn to more important problems.
---
At this point in the conversation the Fiihrer drew attention to the lateness of the day and stated that, in view of the possibility of British air raids, it would be better to break off the conference now that the main points had been sufficiently discussed.
In summary, he stated that subsequently the possibilities of safeguarding Russia's interests as a Black Sea power would have to be examined further, and in general the further wishes of Russia with regard to her future position in the world would have to be considered.
In a closing remarks, Molotov stated that a whole series of great and new questions had arisen for Soviet Russia. As a powerful state, the Soviet Union could not stand aside from the big questions in Europe and Asia.
He then touched on Russian-Japanese relations, which had recently improved. He foresaw that the improvement would continue at an even faster pace, and thanked the Reich Government for their efforts in this direction.
With regard to Sino-Japanese relations, it was certainly the task of Russia and Germany to see to it that they were settled. An honorable outcome for China must be secured, especially since Japan now has a prospect of "Indonesia".
Berlin, November 15, 1940.
Four weeks after this conversation, on December 18, 1940, Hitler will order his generals with his "Weisung Nr. 21": "The German Wehrmacht must also defeat Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England (Barbarossa case)." to destroy the bulk of the Russian army in western Russia and to reach a line from which the air forces of the Soviet Union can no longer attack German territory. The ultimate goal of the operation is to shield itself from Asiatic Russia on the general Volga – Arkhangelsk line ”.
The fully worked out plan was to be submitted to him - so Hitler - until May 1941.
In Berlin six months later, on June 22, 1941, Ambassador Dekanasov will also receive the German declaration of war on the Soviet Union - and in 1963 he will be executed.
His close friendship with the NKVD chief Lavrentiy Beria (Dekanasov began his career in the security apparatus before he became a diplomat) will be his undoing.
But it is the only accessible document about what really happened to these "friends" during the brief friendship between Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union ...
Friends among themselves ...
On November 13, 1940, the following people meet in the "New Reich Chancellery" in Berlin:
Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler and Reich Foreign Minister von Rippentrop on the one hand and Soviet Foreign Minister Wjacheslaw Molotow, one of Stalin's closest companions, and Soviet Ambassador Wladimir Dekanasow. There is also the interpreter Gustav Hilger (seen between Hitler and Molotov) ...:
Hitler phrases and tries to find out what the Russians are up to, Molotov tacts carefully, Ribbentrop is also allowed to say something briefly three times and so the world is divided up by the way - Hilger and Dekanasov translate and Ambassador Dekanasow ...
... also takes notes and keeps a record, which he will write down two days later.
It is interesting that the “Führer”, who had just fantasized about the German superiority, is in a hurry towards the end to end the conversation because there is a risk of British bombing attacks.
Dekanasow's transcript has been preserved - a document of the times.
Here is the translation - unchanged, although it is interesting that Dekanasow always writes of the "Führer", not of "Adolf Hitler" ...:
Der Führer took up Molotov's remark during yesterday's conversation that the German-Russian agreement had been fulfilled with the exception of one point, namely Finland.
Molotow specified that this remark referred not only to the German-Russian agreement itself, but above all to the secret protocols (the secret supplementary agreement of the "Hitler-Stalin Pact", M.R.).
Der Führer replied that in the secret protocol zones of influence and areas of interest between Germany and Russia had been established and divided up. As far as it was a matter of actual occupation, the German side kept to the agreements, which was not absolutely the case on the Russian side. In any case, Germany has not occupied any territory that lies within the Russian sphere of interest.
Lithuania was already mentioned yesterday. There could be no doubt that in this case the deviations from the original German-Russian agreement were essentially due to a Russian initiative. It remains to be seen whether the difficulties which the Russians had proposed to avoid would actually arise from the partition of Poland later. In any case, the Lublin Voivodeship was not an economic substitute for Lithuania. However, the German side saw that a situation arose in the course of events that made it necessary to correct the original agreement.
The same applies to Bukovina. As such, Germany would only have disinterested in Bessarabia in the original agreement. Nevertheless, it also realized here that the correction of the agreement was expedient for the other partner from certain points of view.
The situation with regard to Finland is very similar. Germany has no political interest there. The Russian government is aware of this. During the Russo-Finnish war, Germany meticulously complied with all of its obligations regarding absolutely benevolent neutrality.
Molotow interjected here that the Russian Government had nothing to complain about in Germany's position in this conflict.
Der Führer pointed out in this connection that he even stopped ships in Bergen that were transporting weapons and ammunition to Finland, which Germany in and of itself had no right to do. Through its attitude in the Russo-Finnish war, Germany would have brought itself into serious opposition to the rest of the world, particularly Sweden. The consequence of this was that during the subsequent campaign in Norway, which in and of itself entailed considerable risks, a large number of divisions had to be deployed to secure against Sweden, which it would otherwise not have needed.
The actual situation is as follows: According to the German-Russian agreements, Germany recognizes that Finland is primarily interested in Russia politically and is in its zone of interest. However, there are two points of view for Germany:
1.) be very interested in the nickel and wood deliveries from Finland for the duration of the war, and
2.) it does not want a new conflict in the Baltic Sea that restricts its freedom of movement in one of the few trading seas that it still has. If it were claimed that Finland was occupied by German troops, this was totally inaccurate. However, troops were being transported through Finland to Kirkenes, about which Russia had been officially informed by Germany. Because of the length of the route, the trains would have to stop two or three times in Finnish territory along the way. However, as soon as the passage of the troop contingent to be transported was completed, no more troops would be transported through Finland.
He (Der Führer) pointed out that both German and Russian interests were naturally directed towards not allowing the Baltic Sea to become a battle zone again. Since the Russo-Finnish war, there has been a change in the possibilities of military operations in so far as England has long-range bombers and destroyers with great range. This would give the British the opportunity to get stuck in Finnish airports.
In addition, there is a purely psychological factor that is extremely stressful.
The Finns defended themselves valiantly and won the sympathy of the world, especially Scandinavia. In Germany, too, during the Russo-Finnish war, there was a certain irritation among the people about the attitude that Germany had to take and has actually taken on the basis of the agreements with Russia. Based on the foregoing considerations, Germany did not want a new Finnish war.
But this would not affect Russia's legitimate claims. Germany did this through its stance on various issues, including: on the question of the fortification of the Aaland Islands, proven again and again. For the duration of the war, however, his economic interests are just as important in Finland as in Romania.
Germany expects these interests to be taken into consideration all the more since it itself showed understanding for Russia's wishes on the question of Lithuania and Bukovina. In any case, it has no political interests whatsoever in Finland and fully accepts the fact that this country belongs to the Russian zone of influence.
In his reply, Molotov pointed out that the 1939 agreement referred to a certain stage of development that ended with the end of the Polish War, while the second stage ended with the defeat of France and is now actually in the third Stage stand.
He (Molotov) recalled that the original agreement with the secret protocol established the common German-Russian border and settled questions regarding the Baltic neighboring states, Romania, Finland and Poland. He also agreed with the Fiihrer's remarks about the corrections made. If, however, he were to take stock of the situation following the defeat of France, he would have to declare that the German-Russian agreement had not been without influence on the great German victories.
On the question of correcting the original agreement with regard to Lithuania and the Lublin Voivodeship, Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Union would not have insisted on this correction if Germany had not wanted it. He just believed that the new solution was in the interests of both sides.
The RAM (Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop) interjected that, although Russia had not made this correction an absolute condition, at least it had been very committed to it.
Molotow maintained that the Soviet government would not have refused to leave things as they were foreseen in the original agreement. In any case, Germany had received compensation for the concession in Lithuania on the territory in Poland.
Der Führer interjected here that, from an economic point of view, one could not speak of a settlement with this exchange.
Molotow then came to speak of the question of the corner of the Lithuanian area and emphasized that the Soviet Government had still not received a clear answer from Germany on this question. However, she expects an opinion.
Concerning the Bukwina he (Molotow) admitted that this was an additional area not mentioned in the secret protocol.
Russia initially limited its demands to northern Bukovina. In the current circumstances, however, Germany must understand Russia's interest in South Bukovina. Here too, however, Russia would not have received an answer to its question on this matter.
Instead, Germany would have guaranteed the entire territory of Romania and completely ignored the Russian wishes for South Bukovina.
Der Führer replied that it would mean considerable concession on the German side if part of Bukovina could be occupied by Russia at all. According to an oral agreement, the former Austrian territories should fall into the German sphere of interest. In addition, the areas belonging to the Russian zone were mentioned by name, e.g. Bessarabia. However, there is not a word in the agreements about Bukovina. Finally, the exact meaning of the word "sphere of influence" was not further defined.
In any case, Germany did not violate the agreement in the slightest. On the objection of Molotow Der Führer replied that the corrections relating to the corner of the Lithuanian region and Bukovina were not of great importance compared to the corrections that Germany had made elsewhere by means of arms.
Molotow insisted, however, on his earlier opinion that the two corrections Russia wanted were of negligible importance.
Der Führer replied that if German-Russian cooperation were to produce positive results in the future, the Soviet Government would have to understand that Germany was in a life-and-death struggle which it wanted to end successfully under all circumstances. For this a number of economic and military-related conditions are necessary, which Germany wants to ensure under all circumstances. If the Soviet Union were in a similar situation, Germany would and should show an equal understanding of Russian requirements. The conditions that Germany wanted to secure for herself did not contradict the agreements with Russia.
The German wish to avoid a war in the Baltic Sea with unforeseeable consequences does not mean a violation of the German-Russian agreements, according to which Finland falls into the Russian zone of influence. The guarantee given at the request and request of the Romanian government is not a violation of the agreements regarding Bessarabia. The Soviet Union must be clear that, within the framework of expanded cooperation between the two countries, advantages of quite different proportions than the insignificant corrections that are now under discussion can be achieved.
Much greater successes could then be achieved, provided that Russia was not now looking for success in areas in which Germany was interested in the war.
The future successes would be all the greater, the more Germany and Russia succeeded in fighting back to back to the outside world, and would be the smaller the more the two countries stood close to each other. In the former case there would be no power in the world that could oppose the two countries.
Molotow in his reply he agreed with Der Führer's final conclusions. He underlined the position of the Soviet leaders, and in particular of Stalin, that it was possible and expedient to deepen and activate relations between the two countries. In order to give these relations a permanent basis, however, questions would also have to be resolved which, although of secondary importance, spoil the atmosphere of the German-Russian relationship.
Finland is one of these questions. If there was good agreement between Russia and Germany, this question could be resolved without war, but neither German troops should be in Finland nor political demonstrations against the Soviet Russian government should take place in that country.
Der Führer replied that the second point could in no way be up for debate, since Germany had nothing at all to do with these matters. In addition, demonstrations are easy to organize, and it is difficult to determine afterwards who the real arranger was. With regard to the German troops, however, he could give an assurance that if a general arrangement were reached, no more German troops would appear in Finland.
Molotow replied that by demonstrations he also understood the sending of Finnish delegations to Germany or receptions of Finnish personalities in Germany. The fact that German troops were present had, moreover, led to an ambiguous attitude on the part of Finland. So z. B. issued slogans that "no one is a Finn who agrees to the last Russian-Finnish peace treaty", and the like.
Der Führer replied that Germany had always acted moderately and that both Finland and, above all, Rumania had advised them to accept the Russian demands.
Molotow replied that the Soviet Government considered it its duty to finally settle and clarify the Finnish question. This does not require any new agreements. The old German-Russian agreement assigns Finland to the Russian sphere of interest.
Der Führer concluded on this point that Germany did not want war in the Baltic Sea and that Finland urgently needed as a supplier of nickel and wood. Politically it was not interested and, unlike Russia, had not occupied Finnish territory. Incidentally, the march through of the German troops would be over in these days. Further transports would then no longer take place.
The decisive question for Germany was whether Russia intended to go to war with Finland.
Molotow answered this question somewhat evasively by declaring that everything would go smoothly if the Finnish government gave up its ambiguous attitude towards the USSR and if the people's agitation against Russia (issuing slogans such as the one mentioned above) ceased.
On the objection of Der Führer, that he was afraid that Sweden would next intervene in a Russo-Finnish war, replied Molotow, that he could not say anything about Sweden, but had to emphasize that both Germany and the Soviet Union were interested in Sweden's neutrality. Both countries are of course also interested in the peace and quiet in the Baltic Sea, but the Soviet Union is quite capable of ensuring peace in this area.
Der Führer replied that perhaps in another part of Europe one would see how even the best military will be greatly impaired by geographical conditions. He could therefore imagine that in the event of a new conflict in Sweden and Finland a kind of resistance cell would be formed, which England or America would provide air bases. This would force Germany to intervene.
He (Der Führer) however would be very reluctant to do so. He had already mentioned yesterday that there might also be a need to intervene in Salonika, and the Salonika case suffices for him entirely. He has no interest in having to work again in the north. He repeated that in a future cooperation between the two countries completely different results could be achieved and that in the course of the peace Russia would get everything that she thought she owed.
It might just be a 6 month or a year delay. In addition, the Finnish Government had just sent a note in which it guaranteed the closest and most friendly cooperation with Russia.
Molotow replied that the words did not always correspond to the deeds, and stuck to his previously expressed view that peace in the Baltic Sea region could be absolutely secured if Germany and Russia were completely clear on the Finnish matter. Under these circumstances he did not see why Russia should postpone the realization of her wishes for half a year or a whole year. The German-Russian agreement did not contain any deadlines, and neither of the partners had tied their hands in their sphere of interest.
Referring to changes to the agreement made at the request of Russia, Der Führer declared that there should be no war in the Baltic Sea. A Baltic Sea conflict would be a heavy burden for German-Russian relations and for the great cooperation in the future. In his view, however, future cooperation is more important than resolving second-rate issues at the moment.
Molotow replied that it was not a question of the war in the Baltic Sea, but of the Finnish question and its settlement under the previous year's agreement. In response to a question from the Fuehrer, he stated that he was envisaging this settlement to the same extent as in Bessarabia and the border states, and asked the Fuehrer to comment on it.
When Der Führer replied that he could only repeat that there should be no war with Finland because such a conflict could have profound repercussions, Molotov declared that this statement brought a new element into the discussion that had not been expressed in the previous year's treaty would be carried into it.
Der Fiihrer replied that during the Russo-Finnish war, despite the danger that allied bases might be established in Scandinavia in connection with it, Germany meticulously kept its obligations to Russia and always advised Finland to give in.
The RAM (Ribbentrop) pointed out in this connection that Germany had even gone so far as to forbid the Finnish President from using a German cable line for a radio address to America.
Der Führer went on to say that just as Russia had pointed out at the time that a partition of Poland could lead to a strain on German-Russian relations, he now declares with the same frankness that a war in Finland would put such a strain on German-Russian relations would represent, and he asked the Russians to show exactly the same understanding in this case as he would have shown a year ago on the Poland question.
Given the ingenuity (sic! Note! M. R.) of Russian diplomacy, ways and means would certainly be found to avoid such a war.
Molotow replied that the German fear that a war might break out in the Baltic Sea was incomprehensible to him. In the previous year, when the international situation for Germany was worse than it is now, the Reich did not raise this question.
Quite apart from the fact that Germany was occupying Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium, it had completely crushed France and also believed that it had already defeated England. He (Molotow) does not see where the danger of war in the Baltic Sea should come from under these circumstances. He must demand that Germany adopt the same attitude as in the previous year. If it did so unconditionally, there would certainly be no complications related to the Finnish question.
If, however, there were reservations, a new situation would arise that would then have to be discussed.
In reply to Molotov's remarks about the military safety of the Finnish question, the Fuehrer emphasized that he, too, knew quite a bit about military matters and that it was entirely possible that if Sweden were to participate in an eventual War stuck America in these areas.
He (Der Führer) I wanted to end the European war and could only repeat that a new war in the Baltic Sea would put a strain on German-Russian relations with consequences that could not be foreseen in view of Sweden's unclear position.
Would Russia declare war on America if it intervened in connection with the Finnish conflict?
As Molotow replied that this question was not topical, Der Führer replied that it would be too late to comment if it were topical. When Molotov then declared that he saw no signs of a war breaking out in the Baltic Sea, the Fiihrer replied that in this case everything would be fine and that the whole discussion was actually of a purely theoretical character.
The RAM (Ribbentrop) in summary pointed out that
1.) Der Führer had declared that Finland would remain in Russia's sphere of interest and that Germany would not maintain any troops there;
2.) Germany has nothing to do with the demonstrations of Finland against Russia, but asserts its influence in the opposite direction, and
3.) the decisive problem of secular importance lies in the cooperation between the two countries, which had already brought great advantages for Russia in the past, but would produce advantages in the future, in addition to the things that have now been discussed, would seem completely insignificant. There is actually no reason to make the Finnish question a problem at all. Maybe it was just a misunderstanding. Incidentally, by concluding peace with Finland, Russia had strategically fulfilled all of its wishes. Demonstrations in a defeated country are not entirely unnatural, and if, for example, the marching through of the German troops provoked certain reactions from the Finnish population, these would also disappear when the marching through stopped. Therefore, if you look at things in real terms, there are no divergences between Germany and Russia.
Der Führer pointed out that both parties agreed in principle that Finland was part of the Russian sphere of interest. Therefore, instead of continuing a purely theoretical discussion, one should rather turn to more important problems.
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At this point in the conversation the Fiihrer drew attention to the lateness of the day and stated that, in view of the possibility of British air raids, it would be better to break off the conference now that the main points had been sufficiently discussed.
In summary, he stated that subsequently the possibilities of safeguarding Russia's interests as a Black Sea power would have to be examined further, and in general the further wishes of Russia with regard to her future position in the world would have to be considered.
In a closing remarks, Molotov stated that a whole series of great and new questions had arisen for Soviet Russia. As a powerful state, the Soviet Union could not stand aside from the big questions in Europe and Asia.
He then touched on Russian-Japanese relations, which had recently improved. He foresaw that the improvement would continue at an even faster pace, and thanked the Reich Government for their efforts in this direction.
With regard to Sino-Japanese relations, it was certainly the task of Russia and Germany to see to it that they were settled. An honorable outcome for China must be secured, especially since Japan now has a prospect of "Indonesia".
Berlin, November 15, 1940.
Four weeks after this conversation, on December 18, 1940, Hitler will order his generals with his "Weisung Nr. 21": "The German Wehrmacht must also defeat Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England (Barbarossa case)." to destroy the bulk of the Russian army in western Russia and to reach a line from which the air forces of the Soviet Union can no longer attack German territory. The ultimate goal of the operation is to shield itself from Asiatic Russia on the general Volga – Arkhangelsk line ”.
The fully worked out plan was to be submitted to him - so Hitler - until May 1941.
In Berlin six months later, on June 22, 1941, Ambassador Dekanasov will also receive the German declaration of war on the Soviet Union - and in 1963 he will be executed.
His close friendship with the NKVD chief Lavrentiy Beria (Dekanasov began his career in the security apparatus before he became a diplomat) will be his undoing.
