Waterloo - the truth?

[The Riveteer]

I’ve just finished reading Waterloo the Truth at Last by Paul L Dawson (ISBN 978-1-52670-245-6), and thought it well worthy of discussion.

I can’t say I’d recommend it as an easy read. It is very dry, and for every page of analysis or source quotes there are a couple of pages of tables and in-depth lists of many of the individual soldiers service histories and injuries on the day of battle, which get a bit tedious and unnecessary to the main thrust of the narrative.
However;-
What Dawson has done is made a thorough study of official French casualty and roll call records of the army (French army that is), using them to challenge, with French and many Allied eye witness reports, many of the established Waterloo “Myths”.
I have read many Waterloo books over the past 40 years. Most come up with a few new facts, perspectives or opinions. This book does so with (IMHO) pretty rational and hard to dispute evidence.

I won’t go into great detail – you’ll have to read it yourselves; but to whet your curiosity, among other things Dawson reflects on;-

Napoleon knew Grouchy was engaging at least one Prussian Corps before the battle even started and must have been at least aware of the possibility of Prussian intervention especially after having then receiving information confirming it from the captured Prussian hussar.

The late start due to the ground needing to dry out was probably a red herring, the late arrival and concentration of the army well into the late morning having more influence.

The Sappeur that broke into Hougoumont probably wasn’t Legros.

Ponsonby probably wasn’t killed by lancers.

The Scot’s Greys probably didn’t get as far as the Grand Battery but only attacked 1st Corps’ Divisional artillery and some support from the Grand battery sent forward to support Durutte’s attack.

The Great cavalry charges were supported by Artillery and the Guard’s attack was supporting elements of the 2nd and 1st corps – The 52nd may have attacked some of this infantry rather than the guard itself and the Dutch advance and resistance can be argued to have been as much responsible for the repulse as Maitland’s guards.

Hougoumont did not draw in all of 2nd Corps, only one of its Divisions.

The General allied advance was not an immediate response to the Guard’s retreat and took place at least ten minutes later preceded by the Allied cavalry.

The fighting between Paplotte and Plancenoit was probably as intense as the actions taking place on the main Allied army line and inflicted much more damage on the Guard as a whole than the main allied line

Cambronne probably wasn’t captured by Halkett but retreated with the Chasseur remnants to somewhere between Plancenoit and Genappe on the Brussels road.

The “last stand” of the Old Guard probably took place there and was attacked by Prussian cavalry and Artillery not the British cavalry as usually depicted.

The tables of casualties make dull reading but suggest that neither the French cavalry charges or the Guard attack were as devastating to loss of life as usually portrayed;- for example the Guard casualties for the day show that Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the 3rd and fourth regiments were captured in large numbers (presumably by the advancing cavalry).
Even the 2nd Battalion of the 1nd Chasseurs (Cambronne’s) returns show 419 captured against 27 killed, wounded or missing. Although that “captured” figure will include many wounded and dying when they were taken, it suggests more losses were incurred in the gradual break-up of the regiment during its retrograde movement, rather than the established “massacre”.

Some of these claims may appear outrageous to some. I’ve used my own “probable’s” here and there in this post, as we can never be 100% sure of anything, but I am reasonably convinced myself after having considered Dawson’s records and analysis which I found very compelling.

So; - Have you read the book? What were your conclusions?

David

 

[OldTaff]

I've had this marvellous book since its publication, and discussed it often with like-minded Waterloo afficionados. Mr. Dawson had access to many archives that had only been opened in 2016 (At the French Army Archive at Valenciennes) so much of his research is fresh on the historical scene. I would recommend anyone interested in the battle to read it, if only for some of the myth-busting.

Alan

 

[theBaron]

It sounds interesting; I'll have to get a copy. It sounds like it doesn't change fundamental ideas about the battle, though, in the way that "Shattered Sword" revises our understanding of the Battle of Midway. It sounds rather like it corrects or clarifies opinions or conclusions held about many details that make up the tapestry of our understanding of the battle, as it were.

Coincidentally, I just finished re-reading Peter Hofschröer's "1815: The Waterloo Campaign", which provides the perspective of the Prussians, Brunswickers, Nassauer, Hessians, and Netherlanders in the campaign. That also provides a perspective not as well-known as the "common knowledge" about the campaign.

Prost!
Brad

 

[The Riveteer]

It sounds interesting; I'll have to get a copy. It sounds like it doesn't change fundamental ideas about the battle, though, ........ It sounds rather like it corrects or clarifies opinions or conclusions held about many details that make up the tapestry of our understanding of the battle, as it were.

Brad

No, it doesn't change anything in respect of the battle's events or outcomes but it challenges many "myths" that have become "accepted fact" over the years.
I myself have often argued that Cambronne' s Square of the Old Guard Chasseurs should not have an eagle, as it would have been left with the senior Battalion under Major Duuring at Le Caillou; however, Dawson quotes Duuring as saying that he gave the eagle to Cambronne as he passed Le Caillou on his way to the main line of battle.
So you see, even an old "know it all" like me can get it wrong sometimes.
My one big critisism of the book though, is a distinct lack of maps/diagrams, of which there are none. The book kind of assumes that you know where places are in relation to one another and I imagine that would be very confusing to all but the seasoned "Waterlooer". You really need a map open next to you in respect of the Prussian intervention in particular.

David

 

[OldTaff]

Which is exactly what I had when poring over the details (once again!). The old "Accepted facts" are mainly those which have been reiterated from one historian after another, dare one say, without their own research in the original material? I've read so much of the various accounts over the years, and without casting aspersions in any direction, I come to the conclusion that some authors don't want to be seen as going out on a limb with an alternative view. Unlike Mr. Dawson, an admitted Bonapartist and Francophile (as, I openly confess, am I), who has had the enviable opportunity to consult newly opened archives.

Alan

 

[NigelR]

I was a bit dubious about this book. French accounts will have a different perspective and Paul Dawson is definitely more of a Francophile. I wasn't convinced by some of the theories he proposes. Also, the losers might want to put a positive perspective on things, in the same way the British tried to write the Prussians out of the battle, and also to ignore the crucial role of Chasse's Dutch Division (who pretty much saved the day).

I assume you've read Gareth Glover's book "Waterloo: Myth and Reality"? This gives a pretty convincing set of evidence that supports Cambronne's wounding and capture before any last stand. And of course, writing books that "rewrite the accepted stories of Waterloo" is a sure way to get publisher's interest and people to buy it. And of course Gareth Glover has another Waterloo book as well (The Great Waterloo Controversy) so he certainly sees mileage in it......

But the book is interesting nonetheless and although we have a much clearer picture of what happened at Waterloo due to recent research, it's clear some of the controversy will continue. Which makes it interesting for us Napoleonic buffs!

 

[Chrisr]

I find Dawson's works very tedious, disjointed and full of lists. The best account of the Waterloo campaign I have read is John Hussey's two volume work Waterloo: The Campaign of 1815. My review of it:
Waterloo: The Campaign of 1815.
Volume 1. From Elba to Ligny and Quatre Bras. 712 pp
Volume 2. From Waterloo to The Restoration of Peace in Europe. 582 pp.
John Hussey, Greenhill Books, c/o Pen & Sword, Barnsley, S. Yorkshire, 2017

This excellent, magisterial study will be the standard work on the Waterloo campaign for years to come, and in it John Hussey delivers a lesson on how history ought to be written. Most volumes concerning Waterloo are limited to the campaign in Belgium during those four fateful days in June 1815, or to the decisive battle itself. Hussey casts his net wider, covering the whole of Napoleon's 100 days, commencing with an overview of Europe's experience of Napoleon between 1797 and 1814 and ending with the Settlement of 1815.

Volume 1 covers the period prior to Napoleon's escape from Elba, the Allied response to his landing in France, the preparations and plans of the French and Allied armies, the opening moves on 15 June, and ends with the conclusion of the twin battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras on 16 June. Volume 2 continues the story with the withdrawal of the Anglo-Allied and Prussian armies to Mont St Jean and Wavre respectively, and deals largely with the fighting on the 18 June, followed by the Allied pursuit, the fall of Paris, and the results of the Congress of Vienna. It concludes with a lengthy retrospect which summarises the many issues Hussey addresses throughout his work.

This is not simply a narrative of those momentous events, nor is it a purely analytical narrative, rather it reads more like a discussion that combines a narrative of the events with analysis, consideration, and penetrating insights into the many controversies and myths that have abounded over the past 200 years. Yet in doing so Hussey keeps the story flowing smoothly, moving along at a good pace in an easily read and engaging style. While analysis and consideration of the controversies, myths and conflicting views are interspersed in the narrative of events, they do not detract from the story, as the more lengthy discussions are addressed in appendices at the end of each chapter. In examining them the author draws on thirty years of meticulous research and writing. With each issue he relates the various views of participants and authors, highlights inconsistencies, and presents evidence to support or dispute a particular case, and at the end Hussey delivers either what he believes occurred, or concludes there is not enough evidence to say what actually happened. In doing so, he does not force his opinion on his readers, but leaves them to form their own view. His approach is an example that many historians would do well to emulate.

Even those who have read widely on Waterloo will find something new in these volumes, especially concerning the events and debates following Napoleon's return from Elba, together with the options open to Napoleon and the Allies, and the eventual deployment of the armies prior to 15 June. Hussey discusses and critiques these in a fair and balanced manner, showing considerable knowledge about the limitations on communication and the gathering of accurate intelligence at that time. Wellington has been criticised by some historians over the deployment of his forces, especially leaving a large contingent at Hal after the Battle of Quatre Bras, but his dispositions are hard to fault following Hussey's analysis. Similarly, Hussey considers the criticisms surrounding Wellington's reaction to the French deployments, which together with his description and analysis of the fighting at Ligny, Quatre Bras, Waterloo and Wavre, together with the Prussian movements on 18 June, shows a sound understanding of the operation of armies and difficulties of command that is not often displayed by historians. Moreover, his discussion of the Allied pursuit of the defeated French army and the fall of Paris illuminates the events after Waterloo which are rarely addressed in most histories of the campaign. Good, clear maps and tables support the narrative, and the extensive footnotes contain considerable additional information on specific issues.

The Waterloo Campaign of 1815 is a tour de force, and anyone interested in this campaign should have these volumes on their bookshelves. If you only wish to read one account of Waterloo, this is the one to purchase. It is a worthy winner of the Templar Medal for British Military History and the RUSI Duke of Wellington's Medal for Military History.

 

[NigelR]

Interesting. I too did find Dawson's book hard going (compared to Glover's books) but I haven't read Hussey's book. Will definitely give that a read.

 

[The Riveteer]

I was a bit dubious about this book. French accounts will have a different perspective and Paul Dawson is definitely more of a Francophile. I wasn't convinced by some of the theories he proposes. Also, the losers might want to put a positive perspective on things, in the same way the British tried to write the Prussians out of the battle, and also to ignore the crucial role of Chasse's Dutch Division (who pretty much saved the day).

I assume you've read Gareth Glover's book "Waterloo: Myth and Reality"? This gives a pretty convincing set of evidence that supports Cambronne's wounding and capture before any last stand.

But the book is interesting nonetheless and although we have a much clearer picture of what happened at Waterloo due to recent research, it's clear some of the controversy will continue. Which makes it interesting for us Napoleonic buffs!

I havent read glovers book - will try to find it . I would be interested in his eveidence.

Re Cambronne - the quote I have read from Maitland in Adkins book (I have too many other books to plough through at the moment) reads "I had my eye upon, as I supposed, the General Officer in command of the Guards (being in full uniform"
I don't know if this is his account verbatum but the "as I supposed" would indicate Maitland was not that sure himself.

Dawson however quotes Cambronnes aide-de-camp as saying Cambroone was hit and "fell confused among the dead" (Mmm, When did you last see Cambronne depicted on horseback?).
General Pelet's account states the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Chasseurs " remained (near La Belle Alliance) after the departure of the battalion of Cambronne" - which suggests that his capture must have been further south of that place. I don't know how far Maitland advanced before the pursuit was abandoned. I have seen arguments to say Wellington met Blucher as much as a mile further south of La Belle Alliance rather than at the Inn itself, and if that is true, Maitland may have got as far as that and captured Cambronne there.

Cambronne is quoted as confirming that he was wounded (which is apparently confirmed by his service record) and left for dead. He did not recall the last stand around the eagle of the chasseurs and that it was possible he was captured before that took place. So he may not have even been with the battalion for it's final "stand" possibly because he had already been captured by Maitland.

Ludwig von Treves (2nd Battalion Duke of York's Regt) also states that the "Imperial Guard tried to reform on several occaisions as they withdrew, following the capture of their General".
Pelet then says the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Chasseurs 2 began their retreat and "effected his movement along the road unmolested...reduced to about thirty men (having received) the eagle Cambronne had guarded." "Always marching in square". "What remained joined up with the 1st Battalion who had evacuated Plancenoit".

Pelet confirms he met up with the eagle bearer and tried to stem the flow of the rout around the eagle before the Prussian advance became overpowering.

I still don't know what "actually happened" but I think there is plenty of evidence to suspect it didn't happen between La Haye Sainte and La Belle Alliance as is usually accepted.
It seems (to me) that Cambronne probably left the battlefield (on horseback) , was sometime soon after wounded and left for dead (as many other witnesses assumesd he was). He was then maybe picked up by Maitland in a dazed state somewhere south of La Belle Alliance and would therefore not have been with the Guard at it's last rally point (as he later stated) somewhere near La Caillou.
This seems to consolidate most of the varied "eye witness" accounts without compromising the overiding events too much.

I'm sure others will have equally valid conclusions. but the more we read, the more clearer it might become.

David

 

[NigelR]

The trouble with Dawson's book is that he doesn't cross reference his French sources with enough Allied sources (and the same criticism can be made on a vice versa basis for Glover). However, Glover gives stronger evidence for what happened to Cambronne. He doesn't overtly disagree with Dawson, his conclusion is that Cambronne was captured by Halkett without resistance after Cambronne was floored and dazed by a shell. He was definitely captured because he woke up in a British aid station and was escorted to Brussels by a Sergeant and three men from the Osnabruck Landwehr.

The fact that the Guard formed several rallying squares once the three attacks had failed is mentioned in many accounts. But the depictions of the "last stand" always shows the Grenadiers huddled around their Eagle, which never happened. Potentially they should be showing Chasseurs and Prussians.....

I would recommend you read Glover's book because with that and Dawson you'll be able to gather more evidence and help build a picture by using both.

 

[Chrisr]

I reviewed two of Dawson's book on Napoleonic Uniforms, and as a result decided against purchasing his Waterloo. If it is the same style of those I reviewed I wouldn't waste my money on it.
The reviews are here
https://www.planetfigure.com/thread...d-uniforms-and-equipment-the-infantry.186914/
and here
https://www.planetfigure.com/thread...rd-uniforms-and-equipment-the-cavalry.186918/

 

[Wayneb]

 

[The Riveteer]

Interesting. I too did find Dawson's book hard going (compared to Glover's books) but I haven't read Hussey's book. Will definitely give that a read.

I reviewed two of Dawson's book on Napoleonic Uniforms, and as a result decided against purchasing his Waterloo. If it is the same style of those I reviewed I wouldn't waste my money on it.
The reviews are here

Totally agree, and I concur with your reviews Chrisr.
As I said initially, I can't recommend any of Dawson's books as easy read "entertainment"; they are very dry, but I treat them as information dumps which I find useful if I can spend some time to sift through the data.
Not for the casual reader but if you can find them cheap (as I did), they can be a useful resource (the uniform books do have a lot of photographs, cloth swatches etc.)

David

 

[Chrisr]

Cheers David.

 

[Nap]

Hi Guys

It’s always interesting when a “ new” book ref Waterloo comes out , especially by a Napoleonic writer like Dawson ...

I think he’s opened himself up for much with a title like “The truth at last”

This is a really interesting thread to read closely so thanks to all for contributing

Not likely I will buy it .....but might get it from a library ...if they still exist!

Happy reading everyone

Nap

 

[MCPWilk]

Quatre Bras was a draw, Ligny was a Prussian defeat, but the Prussian army was able to withdraw almost intact. Wellington stood at Waterloo, and did not run for the coast, as Napoleon had anticipated, but stood due to his agreement with Blucher. The Prussians, despite Gneisnau's Anglophobia, did not retreat, again as expected by Napoleon, because Blucher kept his word to Wellington. The Allied victory was just that, an Allied one. Wellington's army was a polyglot one. Most of his Peninsular veterans were in North America. He left a sizeable reserve protecting the route to Antwerp. His army at Waterloo comprised 67,000 men: of these, 25,000 were British, 6,000 were from the King's German Legion, 17,000 were Dutch or Belgian, 11,000 were Hanoverian, 6,000 were from Brunswick, and 3,000 from Nassau. Many of these troops had previously fought for Napoleon.

As stated in the posts above, there are thousands of books on Waterloo. It must have been one of the most examined battles in history, completely obscured by the fog of war, mainly from the smoke of the black powder used throughout. The British like to suggest it was all down to Wellington, which it was, but it wasn't by any means all down to his British troops. The Prussians claim it as a Prussian victory, which it also was, because Wellington would not have stood had not he had Blucher's word of support and because the Prussians arrived at a crucial time. The French like to minimise the reasons for the defeat of their dictator, making excuses for his lack of generalship due to ill health, the topography etc. Napoleon chose to return from Elba, his march towards Brussels was inspired, but at the end of the day, he chose to stand against Wellington, dismissing him as a poor general, he chose when to start the battle and he chose to delegate parts of the battle to his subordinates.

The only way of actually knowing what happened and when, would be to steal a Tardis and hover above the battlefield, but the smoke from the black powder would probably make that a frustrating exercise!

 

[Chrisr]

The only way of actually knowing what happened and when, would be to steal a Tardis and hover above the battlefield, but the smoke from the black powder would probably make that a frustrating exercise!

How true. History is one person's interpretation of what occurred based on the evidence available, and often interpreted with bias. Indeed some write to an agenda t0 push a certain line, some distort the evidence, others pass judgements based on no experience of even having served in the forces, and a few simply distort the truth, eg Peter Fitzsimons in here in Australia. That's why I found John Hussey's volumes so good. Nor do the primary sources necessarily reflect what actually occurred, often people seek to protect their reputations. Nonetheless, there are a good number of very fine historians producing good work these days.

 

[The Riveteer]

Of all the books i've read on Waterloo Dawson's {for all it's inaccessibility} is probably the one that has made me think for myself the most. In his introduction he warns about the same pitfalls that Chrisr describes above. He does not present a scenario for you to blindly follow;- he gives you plain facts and then what he admits are only his own personal conclusions. It's those facts that contradict many of the established narratives of what happened where, when, why and by whom.

I don't want to contradict any of MCPWILK's summary of the battle (which I totally accept and agree with) but I don't know what his point is here. It sounds like he's saying "No point in dredging up further evidence - it's not going to change anything we already know" - I'm sorry If I got that wrong MCPWILK -that is just how it seemed to come over to me.

I don't have any of my own agenda to push here - I myself feel the outcome of the battle (or rather the campaign) was more a result of multiple misjudgements, misunderstands and on- the spot mistakes; rather than any single masterstroke by any of the parties involved. My own interpretation is that the battle was lost, in the case of the French, on the 16th, by the lack of intervention by D'Erlon (not necessarily his fault) and largely won for the allies by the actions of Gneisenau and Uxbridge. I can argue that viewpoint for hours (just for fun you understand) but still I enjoy finding any new evidence that might change my mind.

I find it strange that so many steadfastly hold on to the same story that was retold for over 150 years in Britain, largely based on the accounts of those British officers that Sibourne canvased for their hardly unbiased accounts, some time after the Battle and on Wellington's own dispatches and accounts, considering that he was every inch as much of a "myth builder" and self-aggrandising propagandist as Napoleon was.
Nearly all of those early historians chose to overlook, or had no access to French or Prussian source material and presumably didn't consider it necessary to convey the events as they saw them. Regency authors were basking in the "glory" of recent victory" and later Victorians were more than happy to add to the "glory" of the British Empire's reputation.
[I italicised the word historians there to indicate that I do not think many of the earlier "historians" had the same academic thoroughness or commitment in seeking out more primary source material as the historians writing today (with the exception of Dan Snow, David Olusoga and the makers of Netflix dramas that is LOL)}

Dawson also points out that often a private soldier's account, written to a loved one back home immediately after the battle is more likely to be believable that that of an officer or relative of an officer writing at a later date with a reputation to uphold or redeem. One should also be aware of the date an account was given, as many were given long after the accepted narrative of the Battle had filtered into the national consciousness and become accepted as "fact". (If a soldier saw a high ranking officer killed without knowing who he was and subsequently read multiple accounts of Colonel "Bloggings" being shot near had been on the day; he would then be likely to include "Bloggings" name in his own recollections - accurately or not). Dawson also points out that many Peninsula memoirs refer to Napoleons Polish Guard lancers when the regiment was not there. There are also accounts of Napoleon's Guard Cuirassiers (that obviously never existed). Certain assumptions were made based on a units reputation and it seems that the average british soldier had left his copy of Rousselot at home (LOL).

As MCPWILK also says, thousands of books have been written about Waterloo but most other battles have relatively few. Not many of those other Battles have been argued over in as much depth. There seems to be a resistance to re-evaluating Waterloo in Britain - why mess with the the conclusions that are beneficial to our national pride? But why is it almost considered bad form for the French to defend questionable claims, or for the Germans to redress the balance somewhat?

Whatever the case I will continue to read whatever anyone has to say with an open mind and give any new evidence I find as much consideration as it needs in the hope that it will hopefully chip away myth and get a little more clarification as to what actually happened.

Happy reading
David

 

[NigelR]

There seems to be a resistance to re-evaluating Waterloo in Britain - why mess with the the conclusions that are beneficial to our national pride?

I don't think that's quite true, which is why I would urge you to read both of Gareth Glover's books. Like Dawson, he has has uncovered a lot of new material and his books present some good, well argued thoughts about what actually happened. Add that to what you read in Dawson and you certainly have some fresh perspectives.

 

[The Riveteer]

I don't think that's quite true, which is why I would urge you to read both of Gareth Glover's books. Like Dawson, he has has uncovered a lot of new material and his books present some good, well argued thoughts about what actually happened. Add that to what you read in Dawson and you certainly have some fresh perspectives.

You've sold me on looking into Glover.

Maybe I'm overstating the resistance to new evidence but I was referring to other Waterloo history buffs rather than to professional writers etc. I do know of, and follow, the on-going archeology project at the Waterloo site and would not suggest that any of the new evidence being found there is being evaluated in any other way than fairly.
Maybe I've just been unlucky but I've often met blatant scepticism; the "how does he know, he wasn't there" type, when trying to correct certain misconceptions

At the 2015 Waterloo reenactment I heard an authorised (English) tour guide, at the stone marker for Mercer's troop, telling tourists that Mercer's men ran back to the squares as directed to by Wellington when attacked by cavalry. After the tour moved on I mentioned to him that Mercer made a point of ignoring the directive to avoid unnerving the troops behind him. He asked where I had got that information. I told him from Mercer's memoir. He had never heard of it!
At least that guide was thankful for the information I gave him but it shows how deep the myth persists. The same guide also told the crowd that the french cavalry only had swords so they couldn't do any harm to the troops in square - but I let that one pass.

I just feel the standard accepted version of events has been held without question for so long and become so deeply embedded in the collective psyche that many other Brits just don't want to listen to anything that compromises it.

David