Martin Antonenko
A Fixture
- Joined
- Jul 11, 2008
- Messages
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Protocol of a council of war ...
On the evening of December 8, 1912, in the Berlin City Palace ...
... the German Kaiser Wilhelm II.
... and his key military together:
It's Count Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff ...
... Admiral August von Heeringen, Chief of the Admiralty's Staff,
... Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, State Secretary in the Reichsmarineamt and chief planner of the German naval armament ...
... as well as the head of the Imperial Military Cabinet, Kapitän zur See Albrecht von Müller ...:
The meeting went down in history as a "council of war" because of its far-reaching resolutions!
The word was coined by Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg ...
... who - although the head of the responsible Reich government - was not invited and only found out about the determinations and resolutions afterwards.
The only topic of the discussion is a possible major war in Europe, which all parties independently consider to be "inevitable" or "inevitable".
The emperor himself invited, who had previously learned in confidence from London about secret military agreements between Great Britain and France, which should apply in the event of an "unprovoked German attack" on one of the participating states.
France is also allied with the empire of Russia, which was strengthened again after the Russo-Japanese war, so Germany would have to wage a two-front war in the event of a war.
In the following I will stick to the notes that Captain von Müller made on the "council of war" that night. There are also records of the other participants, who in - insignificant points! - differ from each other.
Kaiser Wilhelm...
... according to von Müller, announced that "if we attacked France, England would definitely help France because England could not tolerate the balance of power in Europe being disturbed."
That prediction will prove to be accurate two years later!
"Austria ...", continued the emperor, "... must act forcefully towards the foreign Slavs (the Serbs), otherwise it would lose power over the Slavs of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. If Russia supported the Serbs, what it evidently does (Sasonov's declaration that Russia will immediately enter Galicia if Austria enters Serbia) war would be inevitable for us too, but we could hope that Bulgaria and Romania and Albania, and perhaps Turkey, would be on our side to have."
Here for the first time the so-called "loyalty to the Nibelung" of the Germans towards the ailing KuK monarchy is expressed and recorded in writing.
If the Austrians attack the Serbs (as will happen in 1914) and the Russians help the Serbs, then Germany too must wage war! This is how the German alliance with Austria-Hungary determines it.
A declaration of bankruptcy for German foreign policy!
In fact, it will happen in the First World War and the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria will fight together with Germany, but Romania will take the side of Russia (and there, due to the miserable condition of its army, will be more of a block on the leg than a reinforcement).
Wilhelm II also lectures:
"If these powers take Austria's side, then we are free to wage the war with all our might against France."
That, in turn, is pure wishful thinking on the part of the emperor, and he has forgotten Russia in his calculation, which is France's ally!
"The fleet must of course prepare for the war against England," says the Kaiser finally, and "immediately submarine war against English troop transports in the Scheldt and near Dunkirk, mine war in Thames." to lead.
The Kaiser closes with the request to Tirpitz to build additional submarines as quickly as possible.
Then the emperor asks for the views of those present.
Chief of Staff von Moltke...
... is the first to comment, von Müller has written down his statements verbatim ...:
“I think war is inevitable and the sooner the better. But we should better promote the popular character of a war against Russia in the spirit of the Kaiserl. Prepare executions. "
Since 1910 (the beginning of Russian military reforms and rearmament after the lost war against Japan), the chief of staff has been obsessed with the fear of the Russian army of millions, the "Russian steamroller" that would simply run over the German army in the east while it was in the West was involved in a deadly struggle with the French.
So von Moltke absolutely wants to wage war before Russia is "finished". Every further day makes the tsar's army stronger, so the motto is "now or never!"
The Kaiser immediately takes up the thesis of the "popular character" of a war against Russia!
noted by Müller ...:
"Due to his well-known good press contacts, the Kaiser asked Tirpitz to work in this direction with his press materials."
What is meant is the propaganda apparatus that the admiral had set up to convince the population (and through them the members of the Reichstag) of the rampant German naval armament.
Then Tirpitz...
...himself speaks to the matter:
"The navy would like to see the great battle postponed by 1½ years. Our chances are currently very unfavorable. But in 1914, when the [Northeast Sea] Canal and [the submarine port] Helgoland are finished, things will be different."
Here the overwhelming strategic importance of the waterway through Schleswig-Holstein, then known as the "Kaiser Wilhelm Canal", becomes clear, on which the navy can move its fleet units anywhere between northern
... reports on December 15, 1812 about the attitude of the emperor to Munich:
“The Kaiser was reluctant to have himself postponed [the war]. The next day he only told the Kr [iegs] -M [inister] that he should prepare a new major army draft at once. Tirpitz received the same order for the fleet. "
I do not want to hide the fact that this meeting is controversial among historians!
The (controversial) Fritz Fischer and John C.G. Röhl (undisputedly one of the greatest experts of the time!) Already see the decision on World War I or at least an important contribution to such a decision-making process before the July crisis in 1914, others - such as Hew Strachan, Theodor Mommsen or Holger Afflerbach - hold this interpretation for exaggerated and do not give the meeting any special meaning for the later escalation.
As I read Captain von Müller's notes, I am almost stunned by the carelessness with which those involved speak openly about unleashing a war for supremacy in Europe and simply cannot agree on the right time for it.
On the evening of December 8, 1912, in the Berlin City Palace ...
... the German Kaiser Wilhelm II.
... and his key military together:
It's Count Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff ...
... Admiral August von Heeringen, Chief of the Admiralty's Staff,
... Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, State Secretary in the Reichsmarineamt and chief planner of the German naval armament ...
... as well as the head of the Imperial Military Cabinet, Kapitän zur See Albrecht von Müller ...:
The meeting went down in history as a "council of war" because of its far-reaching resolutions!
The word was coined by Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg ...
... who - although the head of the responsible Reich government - was not invited and only found out about the determinations and resolutions afterwards.
The only topic of the discussion is a possible major war in Europe, which all parties independently consider to be "inevitable" or "inevitable".
The emperor himself invited, who had previously learned in confidence from London about secret military agreements between Great Britain and France, which should apply in the event of an "unprovoked German attack" on one of the participating states.
France is also allied with the empire of Russia, which was strengthened again after the Russo-Japanese war, so Germany would have to wage a two-front war in the event of a war.
In the following I will stick to the notes that Captain von Müller made on the "council of war" that night. There are also records of the other participants, who in - insignificant points! - differ from each other.
Kaiser Wilhelm...
... according to von Müller, announced that "if we attacked France, England would definitely help France because England could not tolerate the balance of power in Europe being disturbed."
That prediction will prove to be accurate two years later!
"Austria ...", continued the emperor, "... must act forcefully towards the foreign Slavs (the Serbs), otherwise it would lose power over the Slavs of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. If Russia supported the Serbs, what it evidently does (Sasonov's declaration that Russia will immediately enter Galicia if Austria enters Serbia) war would be inevitable for us too, but we could hope that Bulgaria and Romania and Albania, and perhaps Turkey, would be on our side to have."
Here for the first time the so-called "loyalty to the Nibelung" of the Germans towards the ailing KuK monarchy is expressed and recorded in writing.
If the Austrians attack the Serbs (as will happen in 1914) and the Russians help the Serbs, then Germany too must wage war! This is how the German alliance with Austria-Hungary determines it.
A declaration of bankruptcy for German foreign policy!
In fact, it will happen in the First World War and the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria will fight together with Germany, but Romania will take the side of Russia (and there, due to the miserable condition of its army, will be more of a block on the leg than a reinforcement).
Wilhelm II also lectures:
"If these powers take Austria's side, then we are free to wage the war with all our might against France."
That, in turn, is pure wishful thinking on the part of the emperor, and he has forgotten Russia in his calculation, which is France's ally!
"The fleet must of course prepare for the war against England," says the Kaiser finally, and "immediately submarine war against English troop transports in the Scheldt and near Dunkirk, mine war in Thames." to lead.
The Kaiser closes with the request to Tirpitz to build additional submarines as quickly as possible.
Then the emperor asks for the views of those present.
Chief of Staff von Moltke...
... is the first to comment, von Müller has written down his statements verbatim ...:
“I think war is inevitable and the sooner the better. But we should better promote the popular character of a war against Russia in the spirit of the Kaiserl. Prepare executions. "
Since 1910 (the beginning of Russian military reforms and rearmament after the lost war against Japan), the chief of staff has been obsessed with the fear of the Russian army of millions, the "Russian steamroller" that would simply run over the German army in the east while it was in the West was involved in a deadly struggle with the French.
So von Moltke absolutely wants to wage war before Russia is "finished". Every further day makes the tsar's army stronger, so the motto is "now or never!"
The Kaiser immediately takes up the thesis of the "popular character" of a war against Russia!
noted by Müller ...:
"Due to his well-known good press contacts, the Kaiser asked Tirpitz to work in this direction with his press materials."
What is meant is the propaganda apparatus that the admiral had set up to convince the population (and through them the members of the Reichstag) of the rampant German naval armament.
Then Tirpitz...
...himself speaks to the matter:
"The navy would like to see the great battle postponed by 1½ years. Our chances are currently very unfavorable. But in 1914, when the [Northeast Sea] Canal and [the submarine port] Helgoland are finished, things will be different."
Here the overwhelming strategic importance of the waterway through Schleswig-Holstein, then known as the "Kaiser Wilhelm Canal", becomes clear, on which the navy can move its fleet units anywhere between northern
... reports on December 15, 1812 about the attitude of the emperor to Munich:
“The Kaiser was reluctant to have himself postponed [the war]. The next day he only told the Kr [iegs] -M [inister] that he should prepare a new major army draft at once. Tirpitz received the same order for the fleet. "
I do not want to hide the fact that this meeting is controversial among historians!
The (controversial) Fritz Fischer and John C.G. Röhl (undisputedly one of the greatest experts of the time!) Already see the decision on World War I or at least an important contribution to such a decision-making process before the July crisis in 1914, others - such as Hew Strachan, Theodor Mommsen or Holger Afflerbach - hold this interpretation for exaggerated and do not give the meeting any special meaning for the later escalation.
As I read Captain von Müller's notes, I am almost stunned by the carelessness with which those involved speak openly about unleashing a war for supremacy in Europe and simply cannot agree on the right time for it.
